For a long time, ransomware gangs were mostly focused on Microsoft Windows operating systems. Yes, we observed the occasional dedicated Unix or Linux based ransomware, but cross-platform ransomware was not happening. However, cybercriminals never sleep and in recent months we noticed that several ransomware gangs were experimenting with writing their binaries in the cross-platform language Golang (Go).
Our worst fears were confirmed when Babuk announced on an underground forum that it was developing a cross-platform binary aimed at Linux/UNIX and ESXi or VMware systems. Many core back-end systems in companies are running on these *nix operating systems or, in the case of virtualisation, think about the ESXi hosting several servers or the virtual desktop environment.
Even though Babuk is relatively new to the scene, its affiliates have been aggressively infecting high-profile victims despite numerous problems with the binary, which led to a situation in which files could not be retrieved, even if payment was made.
Ultimately, the difficulties faced by the Babuk developers in creating ESXi ransomware may have led to a change in business model, from encryption to data theft and extortion. Indeed, the design and coding of the decryption tool are poorly developed, meaning if companies decide to pay the ransom, the decoding process for encrypted files can be really slow and there is no guarantee that all files will be recoverable.
Coverage and protection advice
McAfee’s EPP solution covers Babuk ransomware with an array of prevention and detection techniques. McAfee ENS ATP provides behavioural content focusing on proactively detecting the threat while also delivering known IoCs for both online and offline detection. For DAT-based detection, the family will be reported as ‘Ransom-Babuk’. ENS ATP adds two additional layers of protection thanks to JTI rules that provide attack surface reduction for generic ransomware behaviours and RealProtect (static and dynamic) with ML models targeting ransomware threats.
Updates on indicators are pushed through GTI, and customers of Insights will find a threat profile on this ransomware family that is updated when new and relevant information becomes available.
Initially, in our research the entry vector and the complete tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by the criminals behind Babuk remained unclear. However, when its affiliate recruitment advertisement came online, and given the specific underground meeting place where Babuk posts, defenders can expect similar TTPs with Babuk as with other Ransomware-as-a-Service families.
In its recruitment posting, Babuk specifically asks for individuals with penetration testing skills, so defenders should be on the lookout for traces and behaviours that correlate to open source penetration testing tools like winPEAS, Bloodhound and SharpHound, or hacking frameworks such as CobaltStrike, Metasploit, Empire or Covenant. Also be on the lookout for abnormal behaviour of non-malicious tools that have a dual use, such as those that can be used for things like enumeration and execution (e.g., ADfind, PSExec, PowerShell, etc.) We advise everyone to read our blogs on evidence indicators for a targeted ransomware attack (Part 1, Part 2).
Looking at other similar Ransomware-as-a-Service families we have seen that certain entry vectors are quite common amongst ransomware criminals:
• Email spearphishing. Often used to directly engage and/or gain an initial foothold, the initial phishing email can also be linked to a different malware strain, which acts as a loader and entry point for the ransomware gangs to continue completely compromising a victim’s network. We have observed this in the past with Trickbot and Ryuk, Emotet and Prolock, etc.
• Exploiting public-facing applications is another common entry vector; cybercriminals are avid consumers of security news and are always on the lookout for a good exploit. We therefore encourage organisations to be fast and diligent when it comes to applying patches. There are numerous examples in the past where vulnerabilities concerning remote access software, web servers, network edge equipment and firewalls have been used as an entry point.
• Using valid accounts is and has been a proven method for cybercriminals to gain a foothold. After all, why break the door if you have the keys? Weakly protected Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access is a prime example of this entry method. For the best tips on RDP security, we would like to highlight our blog explaining RDP security.
• Valid accounts can also be obtained via commodity malware such as infostealers that are designed to steal credentials from a victim’s computer. Infostealer logs containing thousands of credentials are purchased by ransomware criminals to search for VPN and corporate logins. As an organisation, robust credential management and multi-factor authentication on user accounts are absolute must-haves.
When it comes to the actual ransomware binary, we strongly advise updating and upgrading your endpoint protection, as well as enabling options like tamper protection and rollback. Please read our blog on how to best configure ENS 10.7 to protect against ransomware for more details.
Summary of the threat
• A recent forum announcement indicates that the Babuk operators are now expressly targeting Linux/UNIX systems, as well as ESXi and VMware systems.
• Babuk is riddled with coding mistakes, making recovery of data impossible for some victims, even if they pay the ransom.
• We believe these flaws in the ransomware have led the threat actor to move to data theft and extortion rather than encryption.
Learn more about how Babuk is transitioning away from an encryption/ransom model to one focused on pure data theft and extortion in our detailed technical analysis: https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-babuk-moving-to-vm-nix-systems.pdf
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