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Proactive and reactive surveillance

Discussions about pro-active and reactive surveillance have occurred commonly in CCTV but seem to be becoming more prominent recently. This is probably related to the increasing development of large scale CCTV systems using hundreds of cameras. With this development of large scale camera systems, we are finding that the effectiveness of CCTV as a security measure to combat crime is also increasingly coming under scrutiny.

In the UK, for example, a number of recent articles have highlighted that CCTV cameras have a disproportionate rate of detection relative to their number. Mick Neville, DCI of the Visual Images Identifications and Detections Office of the London Metropolitan Police has being widely quoted from an internal Met report as saying that “fewer than one crime is solved by every 1000 closed circuit television cameras.”¹ Yet the BBC² reports that “both the Shetland Islands Council (101) and Corby Borough Council (90) – among the smallest local authorities in the UK – have more CCTV cameras than the San Francisco Police Department (71).” The same article goes on to state that “the London borough of Wandsworth has as many CCTV cameras (1113) as Dublin City Council, the police departments of Johannesburg and Boston and the City of Sydney authority combined.”

Although these camera numbers may appear daunting, these kinds of systems are not uncommon in a number of areas where there is high risk potential for financial loss. Large casinos can typically have 1200 camera systems, while precious metal and diamond mining operations can also top the 1000 camera mark. Further, these kinds of operations have for a long time emphasised the importance of proactive surveillance in the detection of theft and control of loss. A major feature of these operations is that usually a maximum of six monitors, including control monitors, are displayed for any one operator. Quite simply, high risk operations have learned to their cost that they need to prioritise surveillance targets and viewing and be proactive. If they act reactively, they would lose far too much if the theft continues undetected.

Rather than just highlighting a simple proactive versus reactive distinction, I have described below what I feel are clear differences in a range of surveillance levels. Across all of these areas is a need to ensure that operators are trained to have the insights and sensitivity to spot incident conditions, as well as knowing what they are looking for in order to detect the incident. In the visual analysis and behaviour recognition training I do, I find even experienced operators and investigators still benefit from such training. Inevitably, such training leads to the proactive detection of incidents in many of the operations.

Full proactive surveillance – operator led detection of incidents

This is characterised by operators themselves detecting incident conditions during live surveillance. The key in this respect is to ensure that operators have the required observation skills. As importantly, operators need to be trained in how to pick up the signs of incidents developing. The greater the level of situational awareness, sensitivity to the normal practice, and knowledge of what is supposed to happen in the area of responsibility, the better personnel will be able to pick up things, even before the actual incident occurs. Intelligence driven surveillance is a step up on this, providing operators with greater insight as to what they should be looking for and the likelihood of it appearing.

Response driven – alarm activated

This level is somewhat proactive, but surveillance is based on 'technology led detection' of conditions. For example, motion detection or the use of intelligent systems may flag a condition in the scene that the operator must then follow-up on. The key success factor whether the operator is then able to interpret the seriousness and nature of the condition, and arrive at a decision on whether an incident is occurring or not. Given that some of these events may be recognised by technology before they occur, there is still scope for the operator to respond and potentially prevent the occurrence of a theft, or to arrange a timely response to apprehend the culprit. A problem with this type of surveillance is the potential level of false alarms that technology driven recognition and even intelligent systems can produce.

<bIndependent review/audit</b>

Many companies conduct audit reviews of recorded footage to provide for some kind of quality control. Although this occurs after the fact, it still provides a basis for an organisation to detect things that have happened that they may not otherwise have been aware of. Also, there are indications that reviewing can lead to better detection than live viewing. There is not the same pressure, and reviewers are in a better position to repeat parts of the video if they are concerned about something they saw, and can also engage other facilities such as viewing in slow motion.

Post incident data retrieval and investigation

Post incident or truly reactive surveillance is when an event has already occurred and the video is then reviewed to look at footage within specific parameters – eg, a certain time and place or with defined individual descriptions. Unless there is an alert or notification that something has occurred, this data will not be examined. The obvious disadvantage with this kind of scenario is that unreported incidents will never be discovered and the footage will be deleted after a defined time.

Reactive surveillance, while not preventing crime, is nevertheless a potentially powerful technique to follow up on incidents. Although criminals may actively hide their identity making it difficult to use the video, and subsequent investigation of the scene is often impossible as this has changed in the hours subsequent to the report, some of the biggest successes with CCTV such as the Jamie Bulger case, Brixton Bomber, London Tube bombers, and others have been resolved through this method.

A simple reality of proactive surveillance is that personnel must be given the means to do it. As the number of monitors increases, the likelihood of detection decreases. If personnel are not trained in what to look for, proactive surveillance is unlikely to succeed. And finally, your surveillance strategy needs to define what you are going to be doing so viewing strategies are aligned with this.

1. 1000 CCTV cameras to solve just one crime, Met Police admits. Christopher Hope, Telegraph.co.uk. 25 August 2009.

2. Police ‘not using CCTV properly’ BBC.com Monday, 20 July 2009.

Dr Craig Donald

Dr Craig Donald is a human factors specialist in security and CCTV. He is a director of Leaderware which provides instruments for the selection of CCTV operators, X-ray screeners and other security personnel in major operations around the world. He also runs CCTV Surveillance Skills and Body Language, and Advanced Surveillance Body Language courses for CCTV operators, supervisors and managers internationally, and consults on CCTV management. He can be contacted on +27 (0)11 787 7811 or craig.donald@leaderware.com

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