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Counter-terrorism and CCTV

Craig Donald reports back from a counter-terrorism conference held in London last year.

A major counter-terrorism conference was held in London in November 2009 at which current issues and approaches to terrorism were addressed by a number of international and UK speakers. The two-day forum provided an insightful look at international threats, and highlighted a number of main trends that are being faced by all countries. I was fortunate to attend, having being invited by the hosts, Arena International Events, to speak on some of the implications of using CCTV in its application to terrorism.

Much of the initial discussion was dominated by the Mumbai attacks, reflecting that impact that they had on world perspectives, even a year after the event had occurred. With analysis and perspectives from a number of prominent speakers, a variety of critical issues were highlighted about how the attacks had taken place. Those involved in counter-terrorism are highly aware that these would likely be similar to terrorist attempts in the future.

* Main terrorist targets were identified specifically for the sensation value and the association with Western and particularly USA interests. This is a constant theme through most terrorist attacks.

* Reconnaissance was done extensively, with information linked to some of the targets of the attacks being picked up on a suspect apprehended weeks beforehand, but not acted on. The terrorists displayed a knowledge of the layout of hotels and the city that indicated that several had been there before. Similarly, the London tube bombers rehearsed their bombing plan beforehand.

* The terrorist strategy was to maximise death and disruption, and active steps were taken against security forces that were going to respond. We have seen secondary bombs primed to go off to hit emergency response and security personnel in places such as Indonesia and this is also a constant theme of a number of attacks.

* Multiple targets were attacked simultaneously to spread maximum confusion – taxis, for example, had bombs left in them to explode randomly around the city at the designated time. This was a particular characteristic of the Mumbai attacks and was central to the attackers’ strategy. The result was a mix of attacks that were directed at specific targets, and others designed to be random in nature.

* Camouflage was an essential ingredient of the terrorist strategy, from the use of a hijacked Indian ship to land on shore, to the use of unknowing taxis transformed into random car bombs, to the takeover and use of a police vehicle to drive around and shoot people. Student cards from facilities in Mumbai were found on some of the terrorists, indicating for at least one of the conference speakers, that their intention was to blend back in with the local population once the maximum effect had been created. The attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team saw a similar approach where attackers disappeared after the attack.

* TV press coverage was actively used by terrorist handlers to assess not just damage and impact, but terrorist strategy. The terrorists were briefed by their handlers in realtime via cellphone as security responses were happening, such as the time and numbers of Special Forces dropping by helicopter onto the roof of the building they were occupying.

In looking at CCTV and its implications for terrorism, I made the point that crime changes continually in response to security precautions. The same is valid for terrorism, with the Mumbai attacks containing similarities to previous situations, but introducing a range of new threats and dynamics.

A speaker representing one of the major international hotel chains showed how evolving protection at hotels was trying to anticipate threats and how protection had changed over time. A key point is that this protection had resulted in stopping the impact of some major terrorist bomb attacks on hotels around the world, unfortunately with some loss of life of security personnel though. The point was also made by a US police representative that measures that frustrate the purpose of the terror attack can have a major mitigating effect.

In the Mumbai attack one of the targets was the railway station. In the station, two terrorists got into an exchange of fire with two constables armed with a single bolt action Lee Enfield rifle between them. However, by keeping the terrorists occupied for a few minutes, those two guards potentially saved tens or even potentially hundreds of lives as people evacuated the station while the exchange of fire was going on. Having a number of highly armed specialist police groups around the city has now become at least one US city’s precaution to combat a potential terrorist attack similar to that of Mumbai. As security practitioners, we need to constantly think through the potential attacks that can occur.

The use of CCTV in combating terrorist attacks appears to be relatively poorly developed though, and the three speakers including myself were looking at crime and by implication, terrorism as a crime. Professor Martin Gill made the point that those responsible for implementing CCTV have seldom paid attention and listened to those who are responsible for committing the crime. His own research includes interviews with shoplifters and perpetrators of more serious crime to try to understand their perceptions of CCTV and how it affects their actions. It may not be possible to get interviews on their techniques with terrorists, but we need to look at their perspectives, values, and strategies in order to design our systems accordingly. If we align our CCTV viewing more with these needs, our observations are likely to be more effective.

At the conference, I highlighted the possibilities of looking for terrorists and terrorist actions through behavioural recognition and indicators, something I focus on in my training. All crimes have their unique indicators, and people need to do certain things in order to commit the crime. They also show a number of body language signals, whether voluntary or involuntary during that time.

By actively looking for these, we can increase the potential impact of our surveillance by proactively looking for signals that something is likely to happen and recognising it more quickly when it does. Further, once we have spotted a terrorist incident on CCTV, we need to ensure that the CCTV can be used in the most optimal way in order to direct an effective response to incidents.

Facilities to pass on CCTV information, direct attention to critical areas, collate and integrate video information, and generate intelligence to inform security responses needs to be an integrated part of any crises centre. CCTV has huge potential in dealing with the detection and impact of terrorism, but there is a great deal of work still to do in realising this potential in operations and strategies.

Dr Craig Donald is a human factors specialist in security and CCTV. He is a director of Leaderware which provides instruments for the selection of CCTV operators, X-ray screeners and other security personnel in major operations around the world. He also runs CCTV Surveillance Skills and Body Language, and Advanced Surveillance Body Language courses for CCTV operators, supervisors and managers internationally, and consults on CCTV management. He can be contacted on +27 (0)11 787 7811 or craig.donald@leaderware.com

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