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The successful use of CCTV (or not) – lessons from UK research

It has been a bad few months for CCTV in the UK. Firstly, the West Midlands Police issued a report stating that 80% of CCTV images produced were not fit for the purpose for which they were intended in order to produce suitable evidence.

Issues around CCTV are being highlighted and questioned in the public domain including whether CCTV does reduce crime. More recently, in a report issued by the Home Office which is probably one of the most in-depth research reports on CCTV to date, the researchers led by Prof Martin Gill indicated that "the majority of the schemes evaluated did not reduce crime and even where there was a reduction, this was mostly not due to CCTV" (Home Office Research Study 292 - Assessing the impact of CCTV, February 2005). Mike Tennent critically covers some of the technical implications of this report in 'CCTV does not reduce crime' in this edition of Hi-Tech. I am sure that there are many of us who have been exposed to situations where we have seen appreciable crime reductions with CCTV and who would seriously question the broad applicability of the report conclusions. Equally, however, there are many sites where little detection of crime has occurred despite significant expenditure on CCTV systems. I am therefore going to highlight some of the conclusions of this report and provide some comment to put them in perspective.

The Home Office report focuses on public CCTV rather than the industrial and commercial versions that dominate South African operations. Also, the report itself acknowledges weaknesses in how crime prevention/reduction can be measured. For example, particular crimes may not be indicated while an increase in crime in some cases may be an indicator of success as CCTV highlights cases that otherwise may have gone unreported. Despite acknowledging that the research may have weaknesses, the authors are nevertheless prepared to state, "Assessed on the evidence in this report, CCTV cannot be deemed a success. It has cost a lot of money and has not produced the anticipated benefits" (page 120).

This kind of perspective is likely to apply differently to the South African situation as I indicate above. However, there are some key elements that Gill and the other authors focus on that have lessons for all of us. A critical aspect that they mention is that 'There is a tendency to put up cameras and expect impressive results'. This is consistent with a number of situations that I come across locally and overseas. General management, and sometimes security management, believe that the technology by itself is the solution. I have emphasised the importance of management and human factors in the past and the report is consistent with these views. A multimillion-rand/pound/dollar system is still based on the capacity of the operators to detect incidents, and managers to ensure this is done properly. Without the appropriate focus on detection, the CCTV system is like a motor vehicle with an engine that is turning over but not moving anywhere. Things are working but nothing is being accomplished.

It is in the conclusions of the Home Office report that I think some of the most informative points are made. The report clearly states that "the researchers were often not evaluating carefully designed systems which addressed clearly defined crime and disorder problems, so much as a failure of implementation (page 116). Further, the authors go on to state that the failure to achieve crime prevention objectives was arguably less the failure of CCTV as a crime prevention measure than of the way in which it was managed. Technically, it appears that some of the systems evaluated were appropriately designed and suited to task. Aspects of appropriateness of risk assessment and management, staffing, training, and audits of effectiveness of areas of operation appear to have been lacking. Despite a feeling that we may be doing better in South Africa, these aspects also apply here to some extent. South Africans are, however, relatively open to ways of doing things better and may be more prepared to adopt methods and techniques that get the job done. When the UK operations did adopt 'special initiatives' such as dedicated operations on drug dealing or alcohol abuse, the report indicates they were more successful. Interestingly enough, it appears to me that recent training frameworks proposed for operators in the UK are aimed more at the correctness of following procedures and regulations than enhancing the detection skills of operators. Things that would have helped in these 'special operations' such as extensive body language recognition and situational and personal profiling hardly feature in the proposed training, which is dominated by procedures and legislative knowledge.

The importance of CCTV working within a system of security intelligence was also highlighted in the Home Office report. "By providing intelligence to guide monitoring, or by acting on operators' findings ... then CCTV could be very effective" (page 118). I have highlighted the role of intelligence previously in this magazine with contributions influenced by Jeff Corkill who used to be in the Australian military intelligence service and now specialises in security intelligence. There are several operations in South Africa who have a strong emphasis on intelligence gathering, but often the potential to work with CCTV is hampered by a lack of cooperation between these two departments. The comment in the report makes the point that the use and gathering of intelligence information is a strong leverage point for the success of CCTV.

One of the concluding comments of the authors of the Home Office report is that "CCTV is a powerful tool that society is only just beginning to understand. It looks simple to use, but it is not" (page 121). Organisations that rush into CCTV and think that the system will do the work often reflect this perspective. CCTV is an incredibly powerful tool that needs to be carefully managed and integrated into a security management strategy in order to realise its potential. How it is implemented, and how people are equipped to deal with it, makes the real difference between the operations that were reviewed in the Home Office report and the success stories of the industry.

Dr Craig Donald

For more information, contact Craig Donald, Leaderware, 011 787 7811, [email protected]

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