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Criminal countermeasures to CCTV

One of my early memories of CCTV is viewing an employee in a gold plant picking up some gold bearing material, looking around very obviously, and then without any attempt at concealment, putting it into his pocket. He was one of the first successes of the CCTV system, whereupon things got a lot more difficult as those planning theft became more aware of cameras and showed less obvious behaviour.

Now years down the line, crime is becoming increasingly more professional and organised. This is particularly so at a syndicate level and we find that syndicates are increasingly preparing their members, and if necessary, making attempts to rescue them from the justice system.

I emphasise in my training courses that for every action we take as security, there is a counter reaction from the criminal elements. It may not be direct response to hammering down a gate, for example, and rather take the form of crime occurring in another context or area. The spread of ATM bombings as bank robberies and cash in transit heists become more difficult is an example of this.

With CCTV systems we have had a number of things over time, from hosing cameras while cleaning, pushing cameras with brooms or poles so they are out of alignment, maintenance errors which leave cameras inappropriately placed, or obstacles placed in front of cameras. It is important for operators to be aware of these kinds of issues. That is why having a reference camera view photo printed out so one can compare the current camera view to the designated view is a good idea. Similarly, you need to safeguard your footage. It is pointless having a CCTV system if the criminals take off with your DVR or server containing all your recordings.

The one advantage that CCTV has is that we can generally see that somebody is going to try to counter the camera. Counter strategies produce behaviours that one can look for and recognise. However, knowing that CCTV can be effective, syndicates are increasingly targeting security themselves.

Contract security guards in particular are usually at the lowest end of the pay scales, work difficult hours, and are often not supervised to the degree that they probably should be. These factors partially contribute to the fact that such security personnel are often found facilitating or even actively involved in theft – in some cases being offered sums equivalent to months or even years of wages. That is not to say all security officers are like this – I am continually amazed at the calibre of some of the personnel we have in low, poorly paid positions, but who have outstanding potential. Nevertheless, CCTV identifies security involvement in theft on a regular basis.

Given the success of CCTV in identifying criminals, it is logical that syndicates are at some stage going to focus on surveillance operators to help compromise the systems. Instances of turning cameras away, deleting recordings and not following procedures in evidence documentation do happen from time to time. While the vast majority of operators are intending to do their jobs, we do have to deal with syndicate infiltration as a fact of life. I have seen a CCTV surveillance operator acting as an inside accomplice facilitating theft from the control room and displaying all the signs that the criminal directly involved in the stealing on the ground was also likely to be showing. Having cameras in the control room itself is therefore a basic requirement.

Given that syndicates may approach an operator in your control room, what can you do to combat this? Support for operators and staff is critical to try and avoid situations where they are exposed to threat or being comprised. This includes social support, encouragement, rewarding performance, and setting out values which management demonstrate and practice.

Operators need to report on any approach that is made to them. This also allows the company to test whether this does in fact occur. Having measures that check on the integrity of systems as much as possible and providing audit and measurement trails are also important. Ensuring people can be linked to actions is a good way of discouraging adverse involvement.

Personal assessments such as polygraphs or the potential use of polygraphs can also play a part. Where an operator is threatened by criminals and he or she can reply that there is a very high chance they will be caught and lose their jobs because precautions are in place, it makes it more difficult for syndicates to put the same pressure on that person. Expectations of certain levels of detection as a monthly performance measure can also ensure better effectiveness for surveillance, even if these are on a group or shift basis.

The best way of ensuring people stay loyal is to provide the conditions and management culture to promote this as much as possible. We will not overcome these kinds of challenges from crime syndicates by pretending they don’t happen. It is a problem that is going to get worse over time and we need to have strategies in place to anticipate and prevent it.

Dr Craig Donald is a human factors specialist in security and CCTV. He is a director of Leaderware which provides instruments for the selection of CCTV operators, X-ray screeners and other security personnel in major operations around the world. He also runs CCTV Surveillance Skills and Body Language, and Advanced Surveillance Body Language courses for CCTV operators, supervisors and managers internationally, and consults on CCTV management. He can be contacted on +27 (0)11 787 7811 or craig.donald@leaderware.com

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